Constitutional Law—Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord by Foster, Sevawn
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 37 Issue 1 Article 5 
2014 
Constitutional Law—Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking 
Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord 
Sevawn Foster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sevawn Foster, Constitutional Law—Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting 
to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 105 (2014). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
 
 105 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ARKANSAS’S CURRENT PROCEDURAL 
RULEMAKING CONUNDRUM: ATTEMPTING TO QUELL THE POLITICAL 
DISCORD 
The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of pro-
cedure. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following a routine surgical procedure, Teresa Broussard discovered 
an unusual burn at her incision site accompanied by black and purple lines, 
severe pain, and swelling.2 Believing the issues to be attributable to the sur-
gery, Teresa admitted herself to the emergency room where her physician 
released her stating that the damaged skin would soon heal.3 Teresa failed to 
improve and sloughing dead tissue developed on Teresa’s neck and chest, 
forcing her to seek immediate treatment at a burn center.4 Teresa brought 
suit against the hospital as well as the doctors and nurses present throughout 
her operation, asserting negligent medical treatment during and after her 
surgery.5 Despite evidence of negligence, the circuit court granted the physi-
cian’s motion for summary judgment because Teresa’s expert witness did 
not work within the same precise specialty as the defendant—a procedural 
necessity.6 
While the right to bring a claim for a civil wrong is one of America’s 
constitutional strongholds,7 the difference between a claimant’s successful 
recovery and a dismissed claim often hinges on a simple procedural rule.8 
Teresa’s failure to comply with such a rule meant that the court granted her 
physician’s motion for summary judgment because her experts did not con-
 
 1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 2. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 2, 386 S.W.3d 
385, 387. 
 3. Id. at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 387. 
 4. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 387. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 3–8, 386 S.W.3d at 388–90 (referencing the requirements of ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-114-206(a) (Repl. 2006)). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 8. See, e.g., Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–4, 386 S.W.3d at 387–88; Bayer Crop-
Science L.P. v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d 822, 831; Johnson v. Rockwell 
Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 141–42; Summerville v. Throw-
er, 369 Ark. 231, 238–39, 253 S.W.3d 415, 420–21 (2007). 
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stitute “medical care providers of the same specialty as the defendant.”9 
Similar rules of civil procedure have long accompanied substantive laws, 
pronouncing the steps required to have a right or duty judicially enforced.10 
The seeming accord of Arkansas’s procedural and substantive laws has 
recently come to a halt, threatening the state’s system of judicial enforce-
ment.11 Overruling portions of the Arkansas General Assembly’s Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act (CJRA),12 the Supreme Court of Arkansas has repeatedly 
held that various provisions of the CJRA violate the state’s constitutional 
grant of procedural rulemaking power to the judiciary.13 Over time, the de-
bate has intensified over the authority to promulgate Arkansas’s rules of 
pleading, practice, and procedure. 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas currently holds the ultimate power in 
declaring Arkansas’s procedural rules.14 Contrary to this system, however, 
the General Assembly’s Senate Joint Resolutions Five and Six, introduced 
in the 2013 session, proposed a grant of exclusive procedural rulemaking 
authority to the Legislature.15 Although neither of the resolutions passed, the 
legislature’s notion still stands. These two branches of Arkansas government 
must find a way to reconcile their authority with what will best promote the 
constitutional rights of plaintiffs and defendants, as well as the core demo-
cratic principles of separation of powers and judicial efficiency. Allowing 
the court to maintain its rulemaking authority, while permitting the general 
assembly to amend or annul new rules by a two-thirds majority of each 
house, appears to be a compromise tailored to remedy the current procedural 
conundrum. 
This note first details Arkansas’s current system of procedural rule-
making and the problem facing the state’s rules of pleading, practice, and 
procedure. It then examines the growing discord between the legislature and 
the judiciary, analyzing recent case law in light of Arkansas’s CJRA and the 
 
 9. Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
114-206(a)). 
 10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.; ARK. R. CIV. P.; CAL. R. CT.; TENN. R. CIV. P.; TEX. R. CIV. 
P. 
 11. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 2130 (codified at 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206, -208 to -212 (Repl. 2006)); Broussard, 
2012 Ark. 14, at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 387; Bayer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d at 831; 
Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–42; Summerville, 369 Ark. at 239, 253 
S.W.3d at 421. 
 12. 2003 Ark. Acts 2130. 
 13. See, e.g., Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 387; Bayer, 2011 Ark. 
518, at 9–13, 385 S.W.3d at 829–31; Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–
42; Summerville, 369 Ark. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421. 
 14. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3. 
 15. S.J. Res. 5, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S.J. Res. 6, 89th Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
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proposed Senate Joint Resolutions that aimed to vest rulemaking authority 
entirely in the General Assembly. Finally, this note proposes that Arkansas 
can quell the current procedural rulemaking discord by taking a lesson from 
other states and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:16 permit the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas to maintain its procedural rulemaking authority, while 
providing Arkansas’s General Assembly with amendment and annulment 
power exercisable by a two-thirds majority. This system allows judicial and 
legislative oversight, thereby complying with the separation of powers doc-
trine and encouraging judicial efficiency—while protecting the rights of 
Arkansas’s citizens. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Arkansas’s procedural rulemaking system has historically followed the 
traditional model, allowing judges to mandate court rules using their hands-
on expertise with pleading, practice, and procedure.17 In recent years, how-
ever, procedural reform has become a hot-button issue nationwide,18 and 
with Congress’s Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,19 a wave of similar state 
acts arose in an effort to address problems of case backlog, delay, excessive 
costs, and inefficiency.20 In light of Arkansas’s current system of procedural 
rulemaking, the political back-and-forth that has arisen from Arkansas’s 
CJRA and its subsequent partial-nullification lay the foundation for the 
state’s procedural rulemaking discord.21 This section examines Arkansas’s 
current system of procedural rulemaking promulgation, followed by a look 
at the political tug-of-war that has arisen from Arkansas’s CJRA and its ju-
dicial response. 
A.  Arkansas’s Current System of Rulemaking Authority 
Amendment 80, which took effect in 2001, delegated Arkansas’s pro-
cedural rulemaking power to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: “The Supreme 
Court shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all 
 
 16. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.; CAL. R. CT.; TENN. R. CIV. P.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 
 17. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893–97 (1999) (discuss-
ing the rise of the court rulemaking model throughout the twentieth century). 
 18. See Courtney A. Nelson, Case Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis 
v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in 
Arkansas, 59 ARK. L. REV. 781, 781 (2006). 
 19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2013). 
 20. Bone, supra note 17, at 904; see also State Reforms, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/legislation/states (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (presenting an interactive 
map of the United States with links to each state’s enacted tort reform statutes). 
 21. See supra note 11. 
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courts; provided these rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as declared in this 
Constitution.”22 Amendment 80 also permits the General Assembly, by a 
two-thirds vote of the membership of each house, to annul or amend certain 
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas.23 However, rules of plead-
ing, practice, and procedure are not listed as amendable or annullable.24 The 
General Assembly reaffirmed Amendment 80 in 2003 by enacting Arkansas 
Code Annotated section 16-11-301, which states that “[a]ll statutes concern-
ing pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts shall be deemed supersed-
ed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to . . . Amendment 
80.”25 
Before Amendment 80’s enactment, Arkansas’s General Assembly 
possessed authority to enact statutes addressing procedural issues.26 Against 
this legislative power, the Supreme Court of Arkansas struggled to merge its 
“constitutional and inherent power to regulate procedure in the courts” with 
the simultaneous authority of the General Assembly.27 At that time, if a stat-
ute conflicted with a court-promulgated rule, the court only deferred to the 
legislature “when the statutory rule [was] based upon a fixed public policy 
which ha[d] been legislatively or constitutionally adopted and ha[d] as its 
basis something other than court administration.”28 
Amendment 80’s enactment clarified that the judicial branch has the ul-
timate authority to promulgate procedural rules and that any procedural stat-
 
 22. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3. 
 23. Id. § 9. Section 5 allows the supreme court to promulgate rules concerning the appel-
late jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Id. § 5. Section 6(B) gives the supreme court control 
of the circuit courts. Id. § 6(B). Section 7(B) allows the supreme court to establish “[t]he 
jurisdictional amount and the subject matter of civil cases that may be heard in the District 
Courts.” Id. § 7(B). Section 7(D) gives the supreme court superintending control of the divi-
sion of district courts into subject matter divisions. Id. § 7(D). Section 8(A) allows the su-
preme court to prescribe the duties of circuit court referees or masters. Id. § 8(A). Section 
8(B) allows the supreme court to prescribe the duties of district court magistrates. Id. § 8(B). 
See also Kimberly J. Frazier, Legislative Note, Arkansas’s Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003: 
Who’s Cheating Who?, 57 ARK. L. REV. 651, 668–69 (2004) (emphasizing that the supreme 
court’s authority is not subordinate when it comes to procedural rules). 
 24. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 9; Frazier, supra note 23. 
 25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-301 (Repl. 2010); see also Frazier, supra note 23, at 669. 
 26. See 2 DAVID NEWBERN ET AL., ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:3 (5th 
ed. 2013). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Citizens for a Safer Carroll Cnty. v. Epley, 338 Ark. 61, 64, 991 S.W.2d 562, 564 
(1999) (citing Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994); Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 
208, 212, 783 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1990)); see also Frazier, supra note 23 (indicating that it is 
unclear whether the supreme court will continue to defer to the general assembly when the 
statute is based on public policy). 
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utes promulgated by the legislative branch are superseded by the court’s 
rulemaking power.29 
B.  Political Discord: Legislature v. Judiciary 
Vesting procedural rulemaking authority entirely in the judiciary left 
Arkansas’s General Assembly without a voice regarding pleading, practice, 
and procedure;30 however, Arkansas’s CJRA purportedly allowed the legis-
lature to impede on the court’s rulemaking power by minimizing so-called 
“frivolous lawsuits”31—a concept commonly known as “tort reform.”32 
Shortly after the CJRA’s enactment, the Supreme Court of Arkansas de-
clared many of the CJRA’s provisions unconstitutional by examining the 
separation of powers and distinguishing the blurred line between substance 
and procedure.33 
1.  Arkansas’s Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 
The General Assembly enacted the CJRA to remedy conditions “ad-
versely impacting the availability and affordability of medical liability in-
surance” and to “improve access to the courts for deserving claimants.”34 To 
accomplish this, the CJRA made significant procedural changes regarding 
nearly every stage of the litigation process: (1) pleadings, (2) venue, (3) al-
location of fault among parties and nonparties, (4) bifurcated trials, and (5) 
damages.35 
Altering Arkansas’s pleading rules,36 the CJRA added the requirement 
that a medical malpractice claim must include an affidavit signed by an ex-
 
 29. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3. 
 30. See NEWBERN ET AL., supra note 26. 
 31. See Ryan Kent Culpepper, Comment, Justice Reformed: Johnson v. Rockwell Au-
tomation, Inc., Torts, and the Separation of Powers in Arkansas, 63 ARK. L. REV. 283, 283 
(2010). 
 32. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, No. 649, 2003 Ark. Acts 2130 (codified at 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206, -208 to -212 (Repl. 2006)); Culpepper, 
supra note 31. 
 33. See, e.g., Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 
386 S.W.3d 385, 387; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d 
822, 831; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 
141–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 239, 253 S.W.3d 415, 421 (2007). 
 34. 2003 Ark. Acts 2130 at sec. 26; see also Nelson, supra note 18, at 792–93 (showing 
that the CJRA’s policy rationale is closely linked with that of Arkansas’s Medical Malprac-
tice Act). 
 35. See Robert B Leflar, How the Civil Justice Reform Act Changes Arkansas Tort Law, 
ARK. LAW., Fall 2003, at 26, 26–27. 
 36. ARK. R. CIV. P. 7–11. 
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pert in the same medical field as the defendant.37 The statute requires that if 
this affidavit is not filed within thirty days of the complaint, the case must 
be automatically dismissed.38 
The CJRA also altered Arkansas’s venue law.39 Prior to 2003, a person 
was only subject to a lawsuit in the county of his residence, the county of his 
principal place of business, the county where the injury occurred, or in Pu-
laski County for specified actions involving the State.40 Arkansas’s law now 
provides that all civil actions, other than six specifically excluded actions, 
may also be brought in the county of the plaintiff’s residence or principal 
place of business.41 For medical malpractice actions, however, the CJRA 
limited venue to “the county in which the alleged act or omission oc-
curred.”42 
Concerning personal injury actions, the CJRA replaced Arkansas’s sys-
tem of joint and several liability43 with a system of several-only liability.44 
Prior to the CJRA, if two or more defendants were at fault, a prevailing 
plaintiff could collect damages from any liable party, regardless of his or her 
percentage of fault.45 Conversely, the CJRA provides that each defendant’s 
liability “shall be several only and shall not be joint.”46 Each defendant is 
only liable for his or her share of the damages in proportion to his or her 
percentage of fault.47 In furtherance of several-only liability, the CJRA also 
established a procedure whereby fact finders in personal injury cases must 
“consider the fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the . . . injury 
 
 37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(b)(1) (Repl. 2006), invalidated in part by Summer-
ville, 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415. 
 38. Id. § 16-114-209(b)(3)(B). 
 39. See id. § 16-55-213 (Repl. 2005); see also Kelly W. McNulty, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
55-213: Tort Reform Brings Sweeping Changes to Venue Law in Arkansas, ARK. LAW., Win-
ter 2009, at 10, 10–11 (contrasting Arkansas’s venue law before and after the CJRA’s enact-
ment). 
 40. McNulty, supra note 39, at 10. 
 41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-213(a)(3); see also McNulty, supra note 39, at 11. 
 42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-213(e). 
 43. See Crystal Tessaro, Note, NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc.: Lawyers Can 
No Longer Bank on Arkansas’s Application of Comparative Fault in Multi-Tortfeasor Cases, 
55 ARK. L. REV. 659, 665–68 (2002), for an overview of Arkansas’s system of joint and 
several liability before the CJRA’s enactment. 
 44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201 (Repl. 2006); see also Samuel T. Waddell, Comment, 
Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant 
Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 ARK. L. REV. 485, 485 (2013) (describing the abolish-
ment of joint and several liability and the enactment of fair share liability). 
 45. See Frazier, supra note 23, at 671. 
 46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201(a). 
 47. Id. § 16-55-201(b)(1). 
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111 
. . ., regardless of whether the person or entity was or could have been 
named as a party to the suit.”48 
Before the CJRA, courts had discretion to order a bifurcated trial ac-
cording to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.49 Conversely, the CJRA 
allows either party to request a bifurcated trial in any case where punitive 
damages are sought.50 If the trial is bifurcated, it proceeds in two stages.51 
During the first stage of the trial, the fact finder “determine[s] whether com-
pensatory damages are to be awarded.”52 If compensatory damages are 
awarded, the second stage begins, during which the fact finder “determine[s] 
whether and in what amount punitive damages will be awarded.”53 Evidence 
of the defendant’s financial condition is only permitted during the second 
stage of the bifurcated trial.54 
Finally, the CJRA placed limitations on damages.55 As to punitive 
damages, the Act limited plaintiffs’ damages to the greater of $250,000 or 
three times the amount of compensatory damages, but no more than $1 mil-
lion.56 Restricting compensatory damages, the CJRA limited evidence of 
damages for the costs of medical care to “those costs actually paid by or on 
behalf of the plaintiff,” or those for which the plaintiff or a third party re-
mained responsible.57 
Although the CJRA’s beneficiaries are quietly touted as defendants and 
their liability insurers,58 the overall purpose of the CJRA was to reduce leg-
islatively perceived excesses in medical liability litigation by targeting pro-
cedural law.59 Despite its aim, the effects of the CJRA are felt throughout 
 
 48. Id. § 16-55-202(a) (Repl. 2006), invalidated by Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, 
Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135; see also Waddell, supra note 44, at 486 (detailing the 
subsequent history of the nonparty-fault provision). 
 49. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211(a)(1) (Repl. 2006); see also Frazier, supra note 23, at 
669–70 (asserting that the CJRA deprives the court of discretion by making bifurcation man-
datory in cases requesting punitive damages if any party requests bifurcation more than ten 
days before trial). 
 51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211(a)(2). 
 52. Id. § 16-55-211(a)(2)(A). 
 53. Id. § 16-55-211(a)(2)(B). 
 54. Id. § 16-55-211(b). 
 55. Id. § 16-55-208 (Repl. 2006), invalidated by Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 
2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822; id. § 16-55-212 (Repl. 2006), invalidated in part by Johnson 
v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. 
 56. Id. § 16-55-208(a). 
 57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b). 
 58. See, e.g., Robert B Leflar, The Civil Justice Reform Act and the Empty Chair, 2003 
ARK. L. NOTES 67, 67; Nelson, supra note 18, at 792. 
 59. See Leflar, supra note 58; Nelson, supra note 18, at 792. 
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Arkansas’s litigation practice, oftentimes far removed from the medical lia-
bility arena.60 
2.  The Court Interprets the Law: Judicial Fallout 
The CJRA’s broad-sweeping effects prompted the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas to examine the constitutionality of the Act’s provisions.61 Viewed 
in light of Amendment 80 and Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine, the 
court distinguished the line between substance and procedure, holding sev-
eral of the CJRA’s provisions unconstitutional.62 
In Summerville v. Thrower63—four years after the CJRA’s enactment—
the court held unconstitutional the statutory requirement of dismissing med-
ical malpractice actions for failure to timely submit a reasonable cause affi-
davit.64 The provision’s unconstitutionality stems from its direct conflict 
with Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the com-
mencement of an action.65 Examining this conflict, the court defined the line 
between substance and procedure: 
The boilerplate definition of substantive law is “[t]he part of the law that 
creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties,” 
while procedural law is defined as “[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for 
having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that de-
fines the specific rights or duties themselves.”
66
 
Two years later, in Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,67 the Su-
preme Court struck down two more provisions of the CJRA.68 First, the 
 
 60. See Leflar, supra note 58. 
 61. See, e.g., Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 
386 S.W.3d 385, 387; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d 
822, 831; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 
141–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 239, 253 S.W.3d 415, 421 (2007). 
 62. Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 387; Bayer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 
385 S.W.3d at 831; Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–42; Summerville, 
369 Ark. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421. 
 63. 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007). 
 64. Id. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421 (holding that the thirty-day dismissal requirement of 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(b)(3)(A) (Repl. 2006) is directly in conflict with Rule 3 of the 
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 65. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 3; Summerville, 369 Ark. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 421. 
 66. Summerville, 369 Ark. at 237, 253 S.W.3d at 419–20 (alteration in original) (quoting 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443, 1221 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 67. 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. 
 68. Id. at 8–11, 308 S.W.3d at 141–42 (holding that the CJRA’s medical-costs provi-
sion, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b) (Repl. 2006), and the CJRA’s nonparty 
fault provision, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202 (Repl. 2006), violated Arkansas’s 
constitution). 
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court held that the nonparty-fault provision, which required the fact finder to 
consider the negligence or fault of nonparties, violated the separation of 
powers under the Arkansas Constitution.69 By setting up a procedure to de-
termine the fault of a nonparty and requiring consideration of the nonparty’s 
fault, the court ruled that the General Assembly bypassed the court’s rules of 
pleading, practice, and procedure.70 Second, the court held unconstitutional 
the CJRA’s medical-costs provision, which limited evidence of damages for 
the costs of medical care to costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plain-
tiff, or those for which the plaintiff remained responsible.71 This provision 
violates Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine because determining what 
constitutes admissible evidence is a duty constitutionally left to the court’s 
discretion.72 The Johnson court added to Summerville’s differentiation be-
tween substance and procedure by holding that a legislative provision dictat-
ing procedure need not directly conflict with one of the court’s procedural 
rules to be unconstitutional.73 
Further analyzing the blurred line between substance and procedure in 
Cato v. Craighead County Circuit Court,74 the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
found a statute providing exemption from civil process for active duty 
members of the organized militia75 to be substantive, rather than procedural; 
therefore, the statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.76 In 
its analysis, the court further clarified this doctrine by stating that any statute 
that “bypasses our rules of pleading, practice, and procedure by setting up a 
procedure of its own . . . violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.”77 
In Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer,78 the court struck down yet an-
other CJRA provision when it held that the CJRA’s statutory cap on puni-
tive damages violated the Arkansas Constitution’s prohibition of limiting 
damages in personal injury actions.79 Although this CJRA provision did not 
 
 69. Id. at 8–9, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (discussing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202). 
 70. Id. at 9, 308 S.W.3d at 141. 
 71. Id. at 10–11, 308 S.W.3d at 142. 
 72. Id., 308 S.W.3d at 142. 
 73. See Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (referencing Summerville v. 
Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–20 (2007)); see also NEWBERN ET AL., 
supra note 26 (proposing that the holding in Johnson flows from the exclusivity of the court’s 
constitutional rulemaking authority). 
 74. 2009 Ark. 334, 322 S.W.3d 484. 
 75. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-62-403 (Repl. 2003). 
 76. Cato, 2009 Ark. 334, at 7–11, 322 S.W.3d at 488–90. 
 77. Id. at 8–9, 322 S.W.3d at 489. 
 78. 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822. 
 79. Id. at 11–13, 385 S.W.3d at 830–31 (holding ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (Repl. 
2006) unconstitutional). 
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raise procedural or separation of powers issues, the court’s holding further 
illustrates its willingness to critically examine the CJRA.80 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held in Broussard v. St. Ed-
ward Mercy Health System, Inc.81 that the statute requiring a medical care 
provider of the same specialty, practice, and locality as the defendant to 
provide expert testimony in malpractice actions violated the separation of 
powers.82 The court determined that this provision creates a procedural law 
that is solely within the province of the courts because it does not define 
rights or duties, but rather sets witness qualifications.83 The court referenced 
City of Fayetteville v. Edmark,84 which states “[t]he trial court controls the 
admissibility of evidence and the determination of applicable law and al-
ways has the inherent authority to secure the fair trial rights of litigants be-
fore it.”85 
Since the CJRA’s enactment, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has con-
sistently investigated the Act’s provisions for potential unconstitutionality.86 
The court has gone so far as to hold that any statute creating a procedural 
rule violates the separation of powers, even if the provision does not directly 
conflict with the court’s rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.87 
3.  The Legislative Response: Senate Joint Resolutions Five and Six 
The 89th General Assembly’s Regular Session convened on January 
14, 2013.88 The Arkansas Constitution permits each regular legislative ses-
 
 80. See id., 385 S.W.3d at 830–31. 
 81. 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385. 
 82. Id. at 4–8, 386 S.W.3d at 388–90 (holding unconstitutional the portion of ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-114-206(a)(1)–(2) (Repl. 2006) requiring proof of medical negligence “[b]y means 
of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the 
defendant”). 
 83. Id. at 6, 386 S.W.3d at 389. 
 84. 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990). 
 85. Broussard, 2012 Ark. 14, at 7, 386 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Edmark, 304 Ark. at 194, 
801 S.W.2d at 283). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 6–8, 386 S.W.3d at 389–90.; Bayer CropScience L.P. v. Schafer, 
2011 Ark. 518, at 9–13, 385 S.W.3d 822, 829–31; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 
2009 Ark. 241, at 5–11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 139–42; Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 
237–39, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–21 (2007). 
 87. See, e.g., Cato v. Craighead Cnty. Cir. Ct., 2009 Ark. 334, at 8–9, 322 S.W.3d 484, 
489; Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141. 
 88. 89th General Assembly–Regular Session 2013, ARK. ST. LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013); Bob Estes & Jack McNulty, Report on the Regular Session of the 89th General As-
sembly, ARK. LAW., Summer 2013, at 16, 16. 
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sion to refer three constitutional amendments to the people for a vote.89 Pro-
posals for amendments begin in the Senate as Senate Joint Resolutions 
(SJR) and in the House of Representatives as House Joint Resolutions 
(HJR).90 Senator Eddie Joe Williams (“Senator Williams”) introduced SJR 
Five91 and Six92 in an attempt to vest complete procedural rulemaking con-
trol in Arkansas’s General Assembly.93 Senator Williams introduced two 
resolutions so that if one failed, the other could be amended for a successful 
vote.94 Initially, the action was on SJR Six, but then it was abandoned in 
favor of SJR Five.95 
Both SJRs attempted to achieve essentially the same thing.96 Each pro-
posed revising Amendment 80 to provide that the General Assembly would 
prescribe the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for all courts and 
that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would have no authority to promulgate 
rules, except as expressly delegated by the legislature.97 The resolutions also 
proposed that the General Assembly, as opposed to Supreme Court rule, 
would provide the right of appeal to an appellate court from the circuit 
courts, along with other rights of appeal.98 After abandoning SJR Six, Sena-
tor Williams amended SJR Five to maintain Amendment 80’s grant of rule-
making authority in the Supreme Court, while bestowing authority on the 
General Assembly to enact laws that adopt, amend, affect, or supersede the 
court’s rules.99 SJR Five added that the General Assembly would be author-
ized to regulate the award of damages, including punitive damages.100 De-
 
 89. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 22; see also Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22–23 (de-
scribing the constitutional amendments proposed during the Regular Session of the 89th 
General Assembly). 
 90. Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22. 
 91. S.J. Res. 5, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 92. S.J. Res. 6, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 93. See Joey McCutchen, Protect Our 7th Amendment Rights, SECURE ARK. (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://securetherepublic.com/arkansas/2013/03/20/protect-our-7th-amendment-rights/; 
see also Jodiane Tritt, Fourth Week of the Session Comes to a Close, ARK. HOSP. ASS’N 
LEGIS. BULL. (Ark. Hosp. Ass’n, Little Rock, Ark.), Feb. 8, 2013, at 2, available at 
http://www.arkhospitals.org/archive/Legisbulletinpdf/AHALegislativeBulletin02-08-13.pdf 
(summing up the fourth week of the legislative session and Senator Williams’s SJR 5 and 
SJR 6). 
 94. See Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 22–23. 
 97. S.J. Res. 5, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2013); S.J. Res. 6, 89th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2013). 
 98. Ark. S.J. Res. 5 § 3; Ark. S.J. Res. 6 § 3; see also Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, 
at 22–23 (describing the constitutional amendments proposed during the Regular Session of 
the 89th General Assembly). 
 99. See Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22–23. 
 100. Ark. S.J. Res. 5 § 1; see also Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 22–23 (describing 
the progression of SJR 5 during the Regular Session of the 89th General Assembly). 
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spite these alterations, SJR Five did not receive sufficient votes to constitute 
one of the three proposed constitutional amendments referred to the people 
for a vote.101 
4.  Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases 
In light of the back-and-forth between the judiciary and the legislature, 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas created a Special Task Force on Practice 
and Procedure in Civil Cases (“Task Force”).102 The court determined that 
the 2013 legislative session, coupled with the recent cases overruling provi-
sions of the CJRA, revealed a need for review and revision of the Arkansas 
Rules of Civil Procedure.103 
Referencing its process, which allows any member of the bench, bar, or 
public to recommend changes to the procedural rules, the court mentioned 
that all debating parties had failed to submit concerns or recommendations 
to its Committee on Civil Practice.104 Moving past this fact, the court 
acknowledged that a thorough examination of the concerns raised by these 
debates warranted the creation of the Task Force.105 
In its January 10, 2014 report, the Task Force proposed changes to sev-
en existing rules and recommended the adoption of one new rule.106 The 
report’s two major proposals concerned allocation of nonparty fault and 
Rule 11 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.107 In its final report—
issued on January 30, 2014—the Task Force additionally recommended 
amending Rule 702 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence108 by adding a “same 
 
 101. Estes & McNulty, supra note 88, at 23. 
 102. In re The Appointment of a Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil 
Cases, 2013 Ark. 303, at 1–2, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2 (per curiam). 
 103. Id. at 1, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1. 
 104. Id. at 1–2, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2. 
 105. Id., 2013 WL 3973978, at *1–2. 
 106. In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases, 2014 Ark. 5, at 1–
9, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *1–17 (per curiam). 
 107. Id. at 3–7, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *6–14. 
 108. ARK. R. EVID. 702. The current rule reads as follows: “If scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Id. The Task 
Force recommended adding the following subdivision: 
(b) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, a witness in an 
action for medical injury may testify as to the applicable standard of care, com-
pliance with that standard, and failure to act in accordance with that standard on-
ly if: 
(1) the witness is a medical care provider of the same specialty as the person 
whose conduct is at issue when that person is a physician, dentist, or other health 
care professional for whom areas of specialization are commonly recognized; or 
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specialty” requirement for experts in medical injury actions reminiscent of 
section 16-114-206 of the Arkansas Code, which was held unconstitutional 
in Broussard.109 
For allocation of nonparty fault, the Task Force recommended requir-
ing a defendant to assert a contribution claim within the party’s answer.110 
The fact finder would then be charged with determining the nonparty’s pro 
rata share of responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages.111 Concerning actions 
for personal injury, medical injury, wrongful death, or property damage, the 
fact finder would determine the fault of both parties and nonparties who 
may have liability for the plaintiff’s harm under two circumstances: (1) the 
plaintiff settles with a nonparty; or (2) the defendant asserts a contribution 
claim within his or her answer and the defendant meets the burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of the nonparty’s fault.112 
The recommended changes to Rule 11 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil 
Procedure follow the language of Rule 11’s counterpart appellate rule,113 
proposing a nonexclusive list of seven sanctions available to the trial 
court.114 Under proposed Rule 11.1, the plaintiff must append to the com-
plaint a certificate stating that he has consulted a qualified expert who be-
lieves there is a good faith basis for setting forth the claim.115 
In its final report, the Task Force recommended altering the require-
ments of medical injury experts who testify “as to the applicable standard of 
care.”116 The suggested amendment adds a “same specialty” requirement for 
experts when the defendant is a “health care professional for whom areas of 
specialization are commonly recognized.”117 When the defendant is em-
ployed in a nonspecialized health care profession, however, an expert must 
 
(2) the witness is a medical care provider with the same type of professional li-
cense, certificate, registration, or other authorization as the person whose conduct 
is at issue when that person is a health care professional for whom areas of spe-
cialization are not commonly recognized. 
In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Final Report, 2014 Ark. 
47, at 3, 11 (per curiam). 
 109. In re Special Task Force—Final Report, 2014 Ark. 47, at 3–11, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 
122, at *2–13 (discussing the holding in Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 
2012 Ark. 14, at 7, 386 S.W.3d 385, 389 and the same-specialty requirement in Arkansas). 
 110. In re Special Task Force, 2014 Ark. 5, at 4, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *4. 
 111. Id. at 2, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *4–6. 
 112. Id., 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *5–6. 
 113. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 11 (stating the sanctions available for frivolous appeals and 
other misconduct). 
 114. See In re Special Task Force, 2014 Ark. 5, at 4–5, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *9–12. 
 115. Id. at 5, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 64, at *11. 
 116. In re Special Task Force—Final Report, 2014 Ark. 47, at 3–11, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 
122, at *2–13 (per curiam). 
 117. Id. at 9, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *11. 
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only be “a medical care provider with the same type of professional license, 
certificate, registration, or other authorization” as the defendant.118 
The Supreme Court subsequently referred the Task Force’s proposed 
rules to its Committee on Civil Practice (“Committee”) and published them 
for comment.119 The Committee reviewed the proposed rules, along with 
numerous comments from the bench, bar, and public, and submitted a report 
to the court.120 On August 7, 2014, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued 
three separate per curiam orders addressing the work of the Committee and 
the Task Force.121 
The first order adopted the Committee’s proposed changes to Arkansas 
Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 49, and 52 concerning allocation of fault to ab-
sent alleged tortfeasors.122 The amendment permits fact finders to assess 
fault against nonparties as well as parties with whom the plaintiff settles 
outside of court.123 In a dissenting opinion with which Justice Karen R. 
Baker joined, Justice Josephine Linker Hart maintained the following in 
light of the newly adopted rules: 
First, the rules are unclear. Second, the rules are unfair. Third, the rules 
may not survive further constitutional scrutiny. Fourth, there are other 
solutions. 
. . . . 
Furthermore, in adopting this labyrinthine set of rules governing alloca-
tion of fault, we venture into the creation of substantive law, not proce-
dural law, and we, ourselves, violate the dictates of separation of powers. 
Had the majority sought to effect a procedural rule, they could have done 
so by providing a simple jury instruction advising the jury not to allocate 
to the defendant the fault of any other entity and to allocate to the de-
 
 118. Id. at 9–10, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *11–12. 
 119. In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 
49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014 Ark. 340, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *1 (per curi-
am). 
 120. Id., 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *1. 
 121. See In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed 
Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 Ark. 344, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438 (per curiam); 
In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed Amendment to 
Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 343, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437 (per curiam); In re Special Task 
Force—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014 Ark. 340, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 
439; see also Brian G. Brooks, Adventures in Rule Making: The Court Struggles to Make 
Sense Out of Non-Party Fault, and Other Outgrowth From Tort Reform—A Guest Blog Post 
by Brian G. Brooks, REPORTED DECISIONS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://reporteddecisions.com/
2014/08/08/adventures-in-rule-making-the-court-struggles-to-make-sense-out-of-non-party-
fault-and-other-outgrowth-from-tort-reform-a-guest-blog-post-by-brian-g-brooks/. 
 122. In re Special Task Force—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014 
Ark. 340, at 1–2, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *1–4. 
 123. Id. at 4–11, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *4–14. 
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fendant only the fault attributable to the defendant’s acts or omissions, 
thus avoiding the problems engendered by the adoption of these rules.
124 
Justice Hart’s dissent highlights the implications of the language “may 
have . . . liability”—precisely how far does this new language extend?125 
“Does it include those who are immune, those who are outside the long-arm 
jurisdiction of the Court, and those who are protected by the Workers’ 
Compensation bar?”126 Despite Justice Hart’s dissent, the amendments to 
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 49, and 52 will go into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2015.127 
The court’s second and third per curiam opinions sought further com-
ments on the proposed amendments to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 
11, and 42.128 The court suggested an amendment to Rule 3 “providing for 
presuit notice for medical-malpractice cases, [which] would be effective 
upon the General Assembly’s enactment of a companion limitations-tolling 
provision.”129 As to Rule 11, the court suggested that “when a party’s claim 
or affirmative defense may only be established in whole or in part by expert 
testimony,” the attorney’s signature on the pleading or motion certifies that 
“the party has consulted with at least one expert, or has learned in discovery 
of the opinion of at least one expert” who is “competent” and who deter-
mines that “there is a reasonable basis to assert the claim or affirmative de-
fense.”130 Finally, the court proposed an amendment to Rule 42, which pro-
vided in its addition to the Reporter’s Notes that “[t]he circuit court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, determines whether liability for punitive damages 
is to be decided in the first or second phase of the bifurcated proceeding.”131 
As the comment period expired on September 30, 2014, the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas will issue another per curiam opinion concerning its adoption of 
the changes to Rules 3, 11, and 42.132 
 
 124. Id. at 14, 18, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *17, 22–23 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 14–15, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *17–18. 
 126. Brooks, supra note 121. 
 127. In re Special Task Force—Ark. R. Civ. P. 9, 49, 52, & Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 8, 2014 
Ark. 340, at 2–3, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 439, at *3. 
 128. See In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed 
Amendment to Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 343, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437, at * 1 (per 
curiam); In re Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil Cases—Proposed 
Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 Ark. 344, at 2–3, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at 
*2–3 (per curiam). 
 129. In re Special Task Force—Proposed Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 
343, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437, at * 1. 
 130. In re Special Task Force—Proposed Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 
Ark. 344, at 1–2, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at *1–2. 
 131. Id. at 8–10, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at *10–12. 
 132. On November 2, 2014, the date of this note’s completion, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas had not yet issued its per curiam opinion. See In re Special Task Force—Proposed 
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III. ARGUMENT 
Quelling the current procedural discord requires a new formulation of 
Arkansas’s system of rulemaking. By examining various models in light of 
Amendment 80 and Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine, this note as-
serts that a mixed-branch approach to rulemaking is the best course of ac-
tion. 
This section first discusses the arguments for both purely legislative 
and purely judicial forms of procedural rulemaking. The note then examines 
the federal model of procedural rulemaking, as well as the processes adopt-
ed by various states, to demonstrate why the majority of jurisdictions follow 
a mixed approach. Finally, this section illustrates how using both Arkansas’s 
Supreme Court and General Assembly to promulgate procedural rules will 
properly effectuate substance and comply with the state’s separation of 
powers doctrine. 
A.  Purely Legislative, Purely Judicial, or a Mixed Approach? 
Contrary to the majority of models, a multitude of arguments exist for 
both purely legislative and purely judicial rulemaking authority.133 Courts in 
over twenty states appear to have exclusive authority to adopt rules of plead-
ing, practice, and procedure.134 The source of this authority ranges from con-
stitutional provisions, to common law authority, to statutory grant, to a 
combination of the three.135 Although no state maintains a system of purely 
legislative procedural rulemaking, SJR Five and SJR Six would have insti-
 
Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 3, 2014 Ark. 343, at 1, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 437, at * 1; In re 
Special Task Force—Proposed Amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 & 42, 2014 Ark. 344, at 3, 
2014 Ark. LEXIS 438, at *3. 
 133. See, e.g., Bruce L. Dean, Comment, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judici-
ary’s Power to Promulgate Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 139, 149–51 
(1988); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-
Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–14 (1958); Roscoe 
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 43–46 (1952); 
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform Violates the 
Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore the 
Right Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 907–08 (2001). 
 134. CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE COPPOLO, COURT RULES IN OTHER STATES—
LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL, 2008-R-0430, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGIS. RES. (2008), 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0430.htm (providing a summary and 
table listing every state’s system of procedural rulemaking). 
 135. Id. 
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tuted such a system, and arguments exist encouraging this form of procedur-
al rulemaking.136 
1.  Purely Legislative v. Purely Judicial Rulemaking 
Traditionally, the legislative branch is vested with the authority to cre-
ate and enact law.137 As this branch is elected “of the people, by the people, 
[and] for the people,”138 it seems logical to extend the legislature’s authority 
to procedural rules. Victor Schwartz, coauthor of the most widely used torts 
casebook in the United States, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz’s Torts: Cases 
and Materials,139 illustrates the quintessential argument in favor of vesting 
rulemaking authority in the legislature: 
It is not rocket science, but a high school civics lesson showing that the 
legislative branch makes or creates law, the executive branch enforces 
the law, and courts interpret the law. The government works best when 
each branch respects the role of the others. 
Unfortunately, that mutual respect has broken down in the past decade in 
the area of civil justice.
140 
Additional arguments in favor of a purely legislative form of procedur-
al rulemaking include judicial resistance, judicial bias, the perception that 
judges might be out of touch with the needs of litigants and attorneys, a be-
lief that the legislature better reflects the public will, and concerns that judi-
cial rulemaking might inhibit or unreasonably broaden substantive rights.141 
Conversely, as the majority of state supreme courts are endowed with 
primary procedural rulemaking authority, purely judicial rulemaking is not 
without its own supporting arguments: judicial freedom from political pres-
sures, judicial expertise with procedural issues, avoidance of legislative de-
lay to enact needed procedural changes, public expectation of judicial effi-
ciency, the ability to make minor rule changes without undergoing complete 
 
 136. See, e.g., Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 907–08 (arguing that judicial nulli-
fication of civil justice reforms erodes the fundamental balance of powers between courts and 
legislatures). 
 137. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1001 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the development of court rulemaking from nineteenth centu-
ry England to modern America). 
 138. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/gettyb.asp. 
 139. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (12th ed. 2010); see also Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 907 n.a1 (de-
scribing the textbook as the most widely used in America). 
 140. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 907. 
 141. Dean, supra note 133, at 151. 
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procedural reform, and consistent interpretation of rules by the body that 
created them.142 
Although some argue that judicial rulemaking may create or inhibit 
substantive rights, inefficient procedures created by a legislature that does 
not deal with the court system on a daily basis are more likely to restrict 
these rights.143 Because courts see these faulty rules firsthand, they should 
have the authority to change the rules quickly and effectively.144 Anything 
but quick and effective, mass legislative reform takes years to filter through 
the legislative system and is the epitome of judicial inefficiency.145 Judicial 
efficiency instead requires necessary minor amendments according to the 
experience of judges and the suggestions of attorneys and litigants.146 Re-
quiring these small changes to compete for legislative attention is both inef-
ficient and unlikely to successfully procure effective procedure.147 
As this proposal suggests, because small procedural modifications 
would be promulgated after committee suggestions and through the exper-
tise of a qualified bench of judges, “[t]he chances of any high-handed in-
fringement of substantive rights . . . are too small to be taken seriously.”148 
However, if a rule managed to impinge on a substantive right, abiding by the 
proposal suggested by this note, the legislature could amend or annul the 
rule by a two-thirds majority of each house. 
In addition to legislative inefficiency, many of the pro-legislative-
rulemaking arguments—judicial resistance to change, judicial bias, out-of-
touch judges, and the perception that the legislature better reflects the public 
will149—are nullified by the fact that the seven justices of the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas are elected by the general public.150 Section 16 of Amendment 
80 describes the qualifications for an Arkansas Supreme Court justice: (1) a 
justice must be a licensed attorney in Arkansas “for at least eight years im-
mediately preceding the date of assuming office”, and (2) the justice must be 
elected by the general public to serve an eight-year term.151 
As Arkansas’s justices are elected according to public will, if a change 
is necessary to encourage a more efficient court system, a judge will likely 
 
 142. Dean, supra note 133, at 149–51. 
 143. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10–11. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 11. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Pound, supra note 133, at 46. 
 149. Dean, supra note 133, at 151 (comparing judicial rulemaking power with legislative 
rulemaking power). 
 150. Arkansas Supreme Court, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/courts/
supreme-court (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (describing the election process for justices and 
the jurisdiction and power of the court). 
 151. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 16(A), (D). 
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be anything but resistant to that change; an ineffective system only creates 
more strain on the judicial process, the brunt of which falls on judges.152 A 
judge who has been a licensed attorney for a minimum of eight years will 
not suddenly be out of touch with the needs of litigants and attorneys.153 
Additionally, Arkansas’s Committee on Civil Practice directly advises judg-
es of the needs of litigants and attorneys.154 If the judiciary decided to ignore 
those needs, the legislative oversight proposed by this note would allow 
Arkansas’s General Assembly to amend or annul the erroneous rule. 
2. A Model Examination 
The federal model and the majority of state models bestow authority on 
both the judiciary and the legislature, vesting primary rulemaking power in 
the courts.155 Allowing the Supreme Court of Arkansas to continue promul-
gating rules of pleading, practice, and procedure, while granting the General 
Assembly amendment and annulment powers, permits the benefits of both 
the federal model and the state majority model. In light of the various as-
pects of successful court rulemaking, Arkansas’s movement to a more even-
handed system would promote the system of checks and balances and en-
courage judicial efficiency.156 
a.  The federal model 
The federal model allows both the judicial and legislative branches to 
effectuate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.157 The Supreme Court 
of the United States, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,158 promulgates the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which are subject to Congression-
al approval.159 While the primary responsibility for rule development lies in 
judicial committees, Congress has seven months to veto promulgated rules 
before they become part of the FRCP.160 The commentary to 28 U.S.C. § 
 
 152. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 11 (detailing the issues that can arise 
from ineffective court procedure). 
 153. See generally Arkansas Supreme Court, supra note 150 (describing the qualifica-
tions for Arkansas Supreme Court justices). 
 154. In re The Appointment of a Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil 
Cases, 2013 Ark. 303, at 1, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1 (per curiam) (outlining the structure of 
Arkansas’s Committee on Civil Practice). 
 155. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074 (2013); REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134. 
 156. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 42. 
 157. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074. 
 158. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100–702, § 401, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4648–50 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2013)). 
 159. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137. 
 160. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137, § 1001 n.18. 
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2074 describes the Congressional approval procedure as “passive.”161 In 
other words, “[i]nertia means approval. If Congress does nothing within the 
seven-month period stipulated by the statute, the new rules go into effect.”162 
The federal system allows both judicial and legislative rulemaking in-
volvement pursuant to the following structure: (1) the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules, composed of judges, lawyers, and law professors appointed 
by the chief justice,163 proposes an amendment; (2) the proposal is reviewed 
by the Supreme Court’s Committee on Practice and Procedure; (3) the 
amendment is circulated to the public for comment; (4) the proposal returns 
to the Advisory Committee, which may make additional changes; (5) the 
final draft is approved by both the Advisory Committee and the Committee 
on Practice and Procedure and is forwarded to the United States Judicial 
Conference; (6) if accepted by the Judicial Conference, the proposed 
amendment is submitted to the Supreme Court; and (7) after promulgation 
by the Supreme Court, the new rule becomes effective the following De-
cember 1, unless Congress takes action to amend or annul it.164 
Abiding by this process allows the Supreme Court to create rules that 
further an efficient judicial system,165 as opposed to rules that are procedur-
ally inefficient or unfeasible.166 Along with promoting judicial efficiency, 
the federal system simultaneously allows Congress to ensure that the rules 
do not impinge on or create any substantive rights;167 therefore, Congress’s 
ability to approve, amend, or annul the procedural rules allows an important 
check and balance to occur.168 
As the judiciary remains the branch most affected by the procedural 
rules, allowing a committee composed of legal professionals who deal with 
procedure daily ensures that the rules encourage effective courts. Similar to 
the federal model’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, nearly four decades 
ago the Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted a process that “allows any 
member of the bench, bar, or general public to suggest changes . . . or pro-
vide input on” the court’s procedural rules.169 A committee composed of 
both plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys reviews the suggestions and submits 
 
 161. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074 cmt. (West 2006). 
 162. Id. 
 163. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
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 165. See Bone, supra note 17, at 924–25. 
 166. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 133, at 10–11. 
 167. See generally id. at 18–20 (considering why procedural rules intimately tied with 
substantive implications require legislative review). 
 168. See id. at 42. See generally Bone, supra note 17, at 892–93 (describing the checks 
and balances inherent within the federal court rulemaking model). 
 169. See In re The Appointment of a Special Task Force on Practice & Procedure in Civil 
Cases, 2013 Ark. 303, at 1, 2013 WL 3973978, at *1 (per curiam). 
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them to the court for consideration.170 Although the court can bypass com-
mittee consideration, this system allows the rulemaking process to consider 
not only judicial expertise and legislative oversight but also recommenda-
tions of the people who practice according to the rules on a daily basis.171 
Subsequent to the committee’s suggestions, the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas determines whether to promulgate a new or revised procedural 
rule.172 Adhering to the federal model, if Arkansas’s General Assembly had 
the opportunity to alter or reject newly proposed rules, each proposal would 
have a further check on its potential impact on substantive rights.173 This 
check and balance would allow both branches to have a say while promoting 
judicial efficiency and complying with Arkansas’s constitutional require-
ment that the state’s Supreme Court prescribe procedural rules. 
If Arkansas shadowed the federal model, following approval and 
promulgation by its supreme court, the rule or amendment would be sent to 
the General Assembly for approval, amendment, or rejection.174 Like the 
federal model, approval would be passive—if not immediate175—while 
amendment or rejection would require a two-thirds majority of both houses 
by the next legislative session.176 This mixed approach allows both branches 
to voice their concerns while preventing each from overstepping its pow-
er.177 
b. State models 
Courts are authorized to adopt procedural rules in nearly every state.178 
In most of these states, the legislature also plays a role in procedural rule-
making.179 According to a 2008 report on procedural rules, approximately 
thirty states provide some role for the legislature in regard to promulgating 
court rules, but no state vests rulemaking authority entirely in the legisla-
ture.180 Although the courts in approximately twenty states have exclusive 
authority to adopt procedural rules, each state’s approach varies from the 
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next.181 Despite this variation, it is clear that a combination of judicial and 
legislative input is the stronghold of the majority’s method of procedural 
rulemaking.182 
Florida, for example, allows definitive legislative oversight of judicial 
rules through the legislature’s annulment power.183 The state’s constitution 
explicitly gives its supreme court power to adopt rules of practice and pro-
cedure, but the “[r]ules of court may be repealed by general law enacted by 
two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.”184 This 
system of amendment and annulment power falls fairly in line with the fed-
eral system.185 Allowing this form of legislative oversight ensures that the 
proposed rules comply with the state’s constitution and allows a further 
check on the rule’s potential implications. 
Similar to Florida’s system, Texas’s constitution empowers its supreme 
court to adopt rules of administration and procedure.186 The state’s constitu-
tion also provides that the court’s procedural rules must be consistent with 
the state’s laws, which means that Texas’s legislature still reserves the pow-
er to annul or amend the court’s rules by operation of law.187 Again, this 
system follows the majority pattern, permitting legislative oversight. 
Departing from a system of mere amendment and annulment power, 
Tennessee’s proposed procedural rules do not take effect until they are re-
ported to the state’s General Assembly and approved by a resolution of both 
houses.188 Regarding the court’s ability to propose rules, “Tennessee’s con-
stitution does not explicitly address the power to make rules of practice” and 
procedure.189 Although the state’s courts have discussed its inherent rule-
promulgation authority,190 Tennessee’s statutes grant its courts the power to 
adopt rules, which must be approved by the legislature.191 This system al-
lows more legislative oversight than most because enacting a rule requires 
the approval of each house. Despite the house resolution requirement, Ten-
nessee’s system still complies with the majority of states by allowing legis-
lative oversight of the court’s proposed procedural rules. 
 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); see also REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134. 
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 185. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 186. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(a)–(b). 
 187. See id. § 31(b). 
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Unique in its approach, California empowers a judicial council to adopt 
rules for court administration, practice, and procedure.192 The state’s consti-
tution directly endows a judicial council, comprised of judges, members of 
the state bar, and one member of each house of the legislature, with this 
power.193 Although the rules must comply with the state’s statutes, Califor-
nia does not appear to bestow approval, amendment, or annulment powers 
on the legislature.194 Nonetheless, this system gives the legislature limited 
oversight of procedural rulemaking by allowing a member of each house to 
sit on the judicial council.195 Although this check on judicial power may 
seem minimal, it still constitutes a more stringent check and balance than 
Arkansas’s current system. 
While differences exist in nearly every state’s model of procedural 
rulemaking, legislative oversight and compliance with the state’s other laws 
are the strongholds of an overwhelming majority.196 Permitting both judicial 
and legislative involvement in Arkansas’s rules of civil procedure would 
coincide with the majority model, thereby allowing a system of checks and 
balances to ensure effective courts. 
B.  Benefits of a Mixed Rulemaking Approach in Arkansas 
Adhering to the proposal suggested by this note takes advantage of the 
judicial benefits, while allowing many legislative benefits as well. Although 
neither scheme on its own is without reason, in Arkansas, Amendment 80 
mandates that the Supreme Court hold ultimate procedural rulemaking au-
thority.197 Therefore, to encompass the benefits of both systems, vesting 
Arkansas’s General Assembly with legislative oversight of procedure is a 
compromise allowing the best aspects of both schemes to flourish. 
This mixed approach retains the advantages of both the purely judicial 
and purely legislative system while simultaneously reducing the risks in-
volved with each.198 To achieve such an approach, the following sets forth 
the requisite consideration: 
[T]he terms under which rule-making may be entrusted to the courts, and 
the scope and conditions of legislative veto if one is to be provided, can 
be formulated only after inquiring why the vesting of rule-making power 
in the judiciary is intrinsically sound, what, specifically, are the ad-
 
 192. See REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 134; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
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vantages promised, and what dangers or disadvantages run with the 




Vesting rulemaking authority in Arkansas’s judiciary is intrinsically 
sound because the citizens elect their judges in statewide nonpartisan elec-
tions.200 As members of the bar working within the court system on a daily 
basis, these individuals have the necessary experience with procedural is-
sues and a desire to improve the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure to 
create better access to justice for Arkansas’s citizens. The concern of allow-
ing nonlawmakers to promulgate court procedure would be lessened by the 
General Assembly’s ability to amend or annul unreasonable rules. 
This mixed system would permit Arkansas’s General Assembly to 
amend and annul unreasonable rules, but only by a supermajority. The two-
thirds majority requirement will likely prevent unreasonable amendments 
and annulments from occurring and require that the disputed rule or 
amendment necessitate legislative interference. 
1. The Separation of Powers 
This proposal’s constitutional soundness emanates from its compliance 
with Arkansas’s separation of powers doctrine, which provides the follow-
ing: 
The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate 
body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one, those 
which are executive, to another, and those which are judicial, to another. 
No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, 
shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others . . . .
201 
As the CJRA and its subsequent partial nullification have shown, the 
fundamental balance of powers must be restored between the judicial and 
legislative branches.202 This balance requires that the legislature creates law 
while the judiciary interprets it.203 Within the procedural rulemaking arena, 
however, the traditional view has permitted courts to promulgate the nar-
rowly tailored area of procedure because of the court’s familiarity and ex-
 
 199. Id. 
 200. See generally Arkansas Supreme Court, supra note 150 (describing the election 
process for justices and the jurisdiction and power of the court). 
 201. ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–2. 
 202. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 133, at 938. 
 203. See id. at 907. 
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pertise with what constitutes an efficient court system.204 Due to this allow-
ance, the notion that the legislature creates substantive rules and the judici-
ary creates procedural rules is accepted as compliant with the separation of 
powers doctrine.205 
Unwilling to accept this extension of judicial power, various commen-
tators see the judiciary’s exercise of rulemaking authority as an overstepping 
of its distinct governmental role.206 Overruling this strict interpretation, 
however, Amendment 80’s express grant of procedural rulemaking authority 
to the judiciary extends the judicial branch’s power to include that of court 
rule promulgation.207 Because of both the traditional view and Amendment 
80, Arkansas’s delegation of rulemaking authority to the judiciary is appro-
priate. 
Contrary to Arkansas’s Constitution, portions of the General Assem-
bly’s CJRA violated the separation of powers doctrine because the Act cre-
ated rules that are constitutionally left to the court’s discretion.208 Similarly, 
vesting rulemaking authority completely in the legislature, as SJR Five and 
Six attempted to do, violates the separation of powers as Arkansas’s judici-
ary has interpreted it. Providing the legislature with a form of amendment 
and annulment power would appear to more evenhandedly balance the au-
thority between Arkansas’s Supreme Court and General Assembly. The 
court would maintain its constitutional grant of procedural rulemaking au-
thority while allowing the legislature to amend or annul any rules that ap-
peared to expand, create, or impinge on substantive rights. 
2. Procedure Effectuates Substance 
No hard and fast line exists between procedure and substance.209 Alt-
hough Arkansas’s courts have attempted to define the line, it is undeniable 
that procedural rules have substantive effects.210 For instance, pleading re-
quirements, if left unmet, will inherently prevent a party from setting forth a 
substantive claim worthy of judicial intervention.211 
Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure are intended to prescribe the 
steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced.212 Court rule makers are 
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inevitably better suited to integrate and maintain a system of court procedure 
that will enable the legislature’s substantive rules to flourish:213 “[s]o long as 
court rule[-]makers stick to their area of special competence—inferring gen-
eral principles from existing practice and choosing rules that implement 
those principles well in light of practice realities—they act legitimately.”214 
As the line between substance and procedure is a thin one, however, 
bestowing amendment and annulment authority on the General Assembly 
would ensure that the court’s procedure does not impede on or create any 
substantive rights. Additionally, requiring the procedural rules to comply 
with the constitution and statutory law would prevent the rules from infring-
ing on any previously existing substantive rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the court is required to enforce justice, it must maintain the power 
and ability to do so.215 Although the courts must always adhere to substan-
tive law, loading them with legislated procedural requirements will do noth-
ing but prevent substantive law from being successfully enforced.216 The fact 
remains that the Supreme Court of Arkansas has instant familiarity with the 
day-to-day practice of the courts.217 The judiciary should be permitted to 
continue enacting procedural changes simply and without the delay massive 
legislative interference would inevitably cause.218 As this note has ad-
dressed, however, the political discord between both branches mandates a 
reformulation of Arkansas’s current procedural rulemaking system. 
Although Arkansas’s General Assembly currently has amendment and 
annulment power of rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to certain 
sections of Amendment 80, the procedural rulemaking power is not one of 
the sections specified.219 Under Amendment 80, “[a]ny rules promulgated by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to Sections 5, 6(B), 7(B), 7(D), or 8 of this 
Amendment may be annulled or amended, in whole or in part, by a two-
thirds (2/3) vote of the membership of each house of the General Assem-
bly.”220 Amending section 9 to encompass annulment and amendment pow-
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ers over the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority would quell the current 
discord by allowing both the judicial and legislative branch to effectuate 
Arkansas’s rules of pleading, practice, and procedure. 
The proposal suggested by this note would allow the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas to maintain its rulemaking authority, while also permitting Arkan-
sas’s General Assembly to amend or annul new rules by a two-thirds majori-
ty of each house. Legislative approval of new rules would be passive—
effective upon promulgation by the Supreme Court—and require disapprov-
al of a supermajority by the end of the following legislative session. Adher-
ing to the federal model and the state majority rule, this system would allow 
both branches to oversee the rules, while complying with the separation of 
powers and encouraging judicial efficiency—essential components of pro-





tional amount and the subject matter of civil cases that may be heard in the district courts to 
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 * J.D. expected May 2015, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen 
School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, Samford University. I would like to thank my mentors, 
Andy and Tasha Taylor, for their invaluable assistance and direction, the UALR Law Re-
view’s faculty publication board, editorial board, members, and apprentices for providing a 
meaningful outlet of legal scholarship, and my family and friends for their unwavering love 
and support. 
